The Prospect of a Syrian Buffer Zone

When gunfire from the Syrian border killed two refugees in a Turkish camp,  Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan responded with anger and threats against Syria. Sporadic gunfire has since been reported in various Syrian villages close to the border with Turkey, and a significant Turkish troop deployment was reported near the camp where an estimated 25,000 Syrians dwell.

Turkey has utilized these recent incidents to renew its strong rhetoric against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian regime. Such rhetoric has been seen in the past among American, French, and Turkish officials, which included discussions of a buffer zone in Syrian territory. That said, factors remain which complicate the realization of such an operation.

First, Turkey is unlikely to push for a buffer zone without wide international or NATO support. Erdogan’s recent statement that he would request NATO assistance if Syria's offensive continues is an indication that he does not want to conduct such an operation alone. Article 5 of the NATO alliance treaty states that an attack against one member is considered an attack against all member states. NATO would have justification for entering Syria if incursions continue, and in contrast with a United Nations led force, which is unlikely offer support due to a Chinese or Russian veto, NATO would likely be better able to initiate the buffer zone. 

That said, the European members of NATO would also likely be hesitant to support to such a move for fear of harsh ramifications from Russia, who controls a majority of their gas supply. In 2009, Russia indirectly cut off 60 percent of gas exports to Europe following a dispute with Ukraine. With such precedent, a similar scenario cannot be ruled out here, especially considering Russia's military and economic interests in Syria - reason enough for Moscow to back Assad before Istanbul. 

Secondly, Iran’s Shiite leadership continues to support Assad's Alawite tribe, and both parties likely pose concerns to Turkey. Iran’s rising influence in Iraq may empower Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) militants, along with those already thought to be associated with Syrian intelligence agents. After the institution of a buffer zone, the militants' momentum could in fact pose a direct threat in the form of increased militant activity on Turkish soil. This could spur discontent among Turkish citizens, especially if militant activity reaches the major urban centers of Ankara and Istanbul.

It is widely presumed that a humanitarian buffer zone in Syrian territory would require Turkish military support, which Syria would likely see as a provocation, and perhaps even a declaration of war. Even if the zone is expanded to only a few kilometers inside Syria, it could spark a direct confrontation with Syrian troops and PKK militants, or create an even larger refugee crisis, potentially increasing the size of the buffer zone.

It is needless to say that sparking a regional war would not boost Erdogan’s popularity. Ties with neighboring Iran, Syria, and Israel have deteriorated over the last year – relations that do not jibe with Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s “Zero Problems Policy."

For the reasons stated above, along with a general hesitation among foreign powers to intervene in Syria, Turkey stands in a tenuous situation. While Erdogan would like to continue holding the lead role in solving the Syrian crisis, the consequences of establishing a buffer zone are likely to deter such an action from occurring in the near term.

Why the US is likely to up their use of drone strikes even if it makes things worse in Yemen

The United States’ preference for drone warfare in dealing with insurgencies in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan invasion era has become increasingly apparent when viewing their approach to their involvement in the tumultuous state of Yemen. In the month of March, the US launched at least seven strikes against Islamist militants operating against the government in the southern provinces. More strikes have since followed in April leaving close to 30 dead, further highlighting the deteriorating security conditions in the country. However in spite of its effectiveness, drones come with hidden costs that in the end, might prove to affect their usage in the Yemeni conflict.

Drones provide the US with a seemingly painless method of tracking and killing militants in countries where they are hard pressed to justify a serious involvement. With drones, there is no risk to pilots, no rescue missions and no need for Jessie Jackson. The avoidance of having to put boots on the ground can be highly appealing to both the public and decision makers. These birds of prey are known to be used in conflicts in Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia and Afghanistan for both surveillance and kinetic missions. They allow the US to enter into countries where the government is either unwilling or unable to cope with the militant threat.

Yemen falls squarely in the middle of these two categories. While their military has had a modicum of success  in fighting back the Islamist expansion that has grown during the unrest that began with the uprising against the regime of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, militant expansion appears to continue unabated. Coupled with the lack of a well organized military, it has been widely reported that the former president is attempting to undercut the fight against the militants to serve internal political struggles for power. These factors have made relying on the Yemenis to combat al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) linked cells a difficult option.

In spite of these appealing advantages to using drones, recent weeks have seen some of the unforeseen consequences of their application. Due to the fact that the militants are unable to shoot down the drones or otherwise strike at the Americans operating them, they have chosen to respond with reprisal attacks against Yemeni troops and infrastructure. Following a pair of drone strikes in late March, militants struck back with attacks that left 30 soldiers dead and a crucial gas pipeline severely damaged. An additional factor is the backlash from instances of collateral damage against civilians that can quickly turn public opinion against the Yemeni government. Should the leadership feel too much pressure from either the hits against their soldiers or their public, they might decide to order the US out thus ending the

important operations against the Islamists.

While the drone appears to have become the weapon of choice for the US, it is a tool whose use must be balanced in accordance with the overall regional policy as well as local political considerations with the host country. That said, it is easily arguable that as Pentagon budgets become smaller and the US public further looses its taste for war, drone strikes will likely continue to rise in prominence in the US’s fight against Yemen’s Islamist militants.     

Nuclear Deterrence Policy Gone Awry

Frequently, when a state finds itself in a position of genuine weakness, it will seek out courses of action that it believes will best secure its interests at the lowest possible cost. Since its 1979 Islamic Revolution, Iran has attempted to ensure its status as a dominant regional power. In addition to its considerable conventional military forces and heavy handed influences in the affairs of regional states, many in the international community now contend that the Shia regime is attempting to achieve nuclear weapons capabilities. With a rapidly deteriorating economy and a deadly fear of Western backed regime change, the leadership is desperately seeking the proper balance to ensure the continuance of their regime. While it would stand to reason that a regime on the defensive would choose to pursue nuclear deterrence, an analysis of the costs and benefits might explain why certain policies might prove to be less practical than they might appear to be at first glance.

The Islamic Republic now faces its greatest perceived threats in recent memory. The economy has been hard hit with high levels of unemployment and inflation. In 2010, the rial was valued at around 9,000 rials to the dollar. It now trades for somewhere between 12,000 to 21,000 according to the inflated official and black market rates respectively. Sanctions from the West aimed at raising the cost of nuclear development have significantly affected the price of imports and are rapidly depleting crucial foreign currency reserves. The American led invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan along with the decade of neoconservative political rhetoric have further convinced the Shia theocracy that the longevity of their domestically unpopular regime is under threat.

More often than not, a regime will misplay their nuclear hand. Possession of nuclear weapons come with certain advantages. In the case of the Islamic Republic and other semi-isolated states, it can mean a veto against foreign intervention within their sphere of influence. For some, it has ensured the continuance of their regime that otherwise would have been overthrown long ago. However these advantages often come at a great cost, turning a contentious regime into a pariah state. At the same time, abandoning one’s nuclear weapons program can severely weaken a leadership that, lacking their key bargaining chip, becomes vulnerable to overthrow. The two ideal cases of these principles can be seen in the dealings between the West and North Korea as well as the fall of Muammar Gaddafi. The North Korean dictatorship inherited by Kim Jung Il was a starving state facing the combined South Korean and American military forces sitting on its border threatening regime change. Kim realized that he could ensure his regime’s security through developing nuclear weapons. While it is true that he has managed to secure monetary aid and assurances against intervention, Kim has further established North Korea as a pariah state cut off from most of the international community. On the other side of the spectrum is Libya’s former dictator Muammar Gaddafi. In the wake of the fall of Saddam Hussein, Gaddafi opted to surrender his weapons of mass destruction programs in hopes of avoiding a fate similar to the Iraqi leader. This strategy appeared to be successful until the 2011 uprising by his people that was aided by Western powers, most of whom would never have considered confronting Gaddafi had he maintained his arsenal of deterrence.

In considering these cases of cost benefit analysis gone wrong, the parameters of actions open to Iran assists in assessing how the regime is likely to proceed with their program. Iran can not afford to become a total pariah due to its dependency to access global energy markets. Oil exports are estimated to comprise over 60% of state revenues. Iran is also unlikely to give up what is a nationally popular program while fears of Western imposed regime change are rampant. There is perhaps a third middle ground option that would allow both sides to save face while maintaining their primary objectives. Whether the course will include International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors at nuclear sites or assurances for continued low level enrichment, is yet to be seen. That said, there are numerous creative solutions that could be expected to rise out of a future negotiated agreement. What is certain is that a continuance of the status quo is untenable for all sides involved. With the effects of sanctions biting away at the economy and the threat of an oft predicted Israeli air strike in the spring, the clock is ticking for such a compromise to be found. One can only hope that the regime will be able to sort out their internal calculations in time.


Additional reading: travel security services, intelligence reports.

Algeria’s Recipe For Revolution

It began as an all too common story in today’s North Africa. Last week, Algerian policemen harassed an elderly citizen on a public bus in the town of Laghouat, sparking mass riots that let to dozens of arrests and injuries in the southern city of nearly 500,000 people. The Laghouat riots took place nearly two weeks after Tunisia celebrated the anniversary of its revolution, which broke out in a strikingly similar fashion. Like in Laghouat, the riots in the rural town of Sidi Bouzid were sparked by misconduct from a government official, and fueled by the increasingly dire economic situation. While the Laghouat riots failed to spark nationwide unrest, they are part of a growing trend of dissent in the country signaling that the luck of North Africa’s last dictatorship may be running out.

As the only non-monarchic regime in the region to survive the “Arab Spring” unscathed, stability in Algeria has been somewhat of a phenomenon. Like Egypt and Tunisia, the country has long been ruled by a military backed dictatorship, whose people have become increasingly impoverished under its blatantly corrupt practices. Analysts in the West commonly attribute this phenomenon to the country’s bloody civil war, which still haunts much of the population since it subsided in the late 1990’s. That conflict, which claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 Algerians, erupted after Islamist parties swept parliamentary elections in 1991, forcing a military backed coup which installed the current regime.

When sporadic protests began to sprout up across the country in January 2011 along with the rest of the region, it was initially believed that like Tunisia, Algeria would also succumb to the will of its long-mistreated population. Indeed, fears of civil war combined with promises for reform by the Bouteflika regime were successful in stagnating a potential revolution. Nearly one year later, this period of political calm was shattered when the Islamist Movement for Society and Peace (MSP), a moderate Islamist party, pulled out from the ruling coalition, demanding constitutional reforms before upcoming elections in April 2012.

The emboldening of the MSP has coincided with the rise to power of ideologically similar parties in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt, while other, even more extremist parties have begun to make their voices heard as well. The country’s Prime Minister (considered a puppet of the regime) has since rejected demands to step down before parliamentary elections, while the Bouteflika regime remains adamant in its belief that MSP wields little influence over Algerian society.

In addition to renouncing opposition claims of corruption, the regime seems largely disconnected with the dire living conditions facing many of its citizens. As Algeria’s cold winter sets in, a gas shortage has left nearly 14 million people without fuel for heating, while a petrol deficit has resulted in gas station strikes across the country. Meanwhile, an ongoing drug shortage has left many Algerians without access to even basic medicines.

Across the country, dissatisfaction with the government is further highlighted by protests and strikes in nearly every public sector. Teachers, municipal workers, and labor unions have embarked on multiple campaigns to pressure the government for better wages and working conditions, mostly to no avail.

Where the government’s disconnection from the people proves most dangerous however, is its ignorance over the plight of the current generation of young adults. The generation of Algerians which endured the civil war as children, now finds itself struggling to make a living amidst rampant unemployment, while many lack proper education.

As such, the ground is becoming increasingly fertile for an “Algerian Spring”. Opposition parties seem poised to utilize the April 2012 parliamentary elections to highlight the corrupt nature of Algeria’s single-party system. Unbeknownst to the government, conditions for a mass protest on the heels of a corrupt election process are already in place. Should opposition parties such as the MSP form a united front with Algeria’s many labor unions in a national movement, it may very well force the Bouteflika regime from power, quite similar to the revolutions of Tunisia and Egypt.

Given the instability caused by previous revolutions in North Africa, it would be wise for both the Bouteflika regime and its allies in the West to identify this growing tension before it’s too late. While often overlooked, Algeria wields great importance as the Arab world’s second most populous country, as well as a major supplier of natural resources in Europe. Moreover, the current regime has taken a lead role in suppressing the spread of Islamic militancy, even after the destabilization of neighboring Libya. Preventing tensions in Algeria from boiling over require the attention and guidance of not only the West, but also recently reformed regional neighbors. While the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt caught the world by surprise, there will be no excuses for allowing Algeria to slide into chaos.

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A second path towards a nuclear Islamic state?

Just as the Western world concluded its New Year's celebrations, the Islamic Republic of Iran announced that the country's scientists had successfully produced a uranium nuclear fuel rod. If indeed these claims are proven true, it would mark a considerable leap in the Ayatollah’s race towards nuclear capability.

Uranium (U) fuel rods are an essential core component for powering a uranium-based fission reactor. There are several major to the self production of a fuel rod. The first indicates to the enrichment capabilities. The second are the byproducts that are produced in a reactor core.

Firstly, in order to produce a fuel rod, one would have to enrich uranium to level of at least 19.7%, this is a very high enrichment level, yet this is not a weapons grade level. However, this underscores that the Islamic republic has the technological capabilities to achieve 20% enrichment.  It is also contradicts what was previously though that Iran can enrich uranium to a 3-5% level; the distance towards a 90-95% enrichment level is only a matter of time, base material and will.

Secondly, depending on the base substance, a byproduct of a uranium fission process is plutonium. This element is highly toxic (one millionth of a gram is enough to kill a person), and has very little civilian uses. However, plutonium can produce a fission reaction; therefore it is used as a fission material in a plutonium based atom bomb. If in fact Iran has the ability to produce fuel rods, it could also harvest the plutonium, thus opening the door to a second path towards a plutonium nuclear weapon, and not just uranium based one.

Thirdly, due to its high level of toxicity, spent uranium nuclear fuel rods have to be disposed of carefully, especially if they have traces to plutonium on them. Until now, according to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran got its fuel rods from Russia, and it is obligated to return the used fuel rods back to Russia for a proper disposal. Now, Iran would have to dispose of the rods in-house. The problem with this is that Iran has no proper experience dealing with the disposal of wasted nuclear fuel rods; therefore there is an increased possibility that terrorists will be able to put their hands on nuclear waste products in order to produce a nuclear dirty bomb.

Furthermore, it is thought that Iran is only two steps away from assembling a nuclear weapon. It has yet been able to develop a nuclear trigger – this is crucial component that starts the nuclear reaction. The second step is the miniaturization of the bomb to a missile war head dimensions, however, this is not imperative as Iran possess other delivery platforms such as bomber aircraft like the Russia build Sukhoi Su-24.

Moreover, the announcement regarding the ability to produce fuel rods, if true, indicates that the sanctions that are imposed on the country are not effective enough to stop Iran from reaching a nuclear bomb capability. This may open a door for more decisive steps against the Islamic state.

Finally, considering the fact that Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to a 20% level and possibly higher; the fact that it may be able to harvest plutonium from spent fuel rods; and that the county is only one step away from developing a usable nuclear device, with statement previously made by the Iranian leadership regarding the annihilation of the State of Israel. It seems that Iran is in a path towards a nuclear weapon and that it has the willingness to use it. 

Who is really in Control of Southern Lebanon?

Recently rising tension in southern Lebanon has shown that the militant group Hezbollah remains large and in charge. In a recent attack on December 9, a roadside bomb injured five French UNIFIL troops. Although Hezbollah is not directly responsible for the attack, and claimed they are in favor of the UN forces' presence in southern border with Israel, they remain responsible for the security situation south of the Litani River. The situation in southern Lebanon is almost too quiet since the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006. Even though United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701 calls for disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon (i.e. Hezbollah), and no armed forces other than UNIFIL are to be south of the Litani, this does not stop the militant group from unofficially controlling the area. Following a large blast in southern Lebanon last week, UNIFIL officials were once again kept away from the area by Hezbollah security along with Lebanese army, as "investigation" into what caused the blast was conducted.   

Hezbollah is said to possess some 10,000 long-range and 20,000 short-range rockets while utilizing hundreds of houses in southern Lebanon for weapon storage. Some of these weapons include Fajr Missiles, C-802 Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles, Zelzal unguided artillery rocket and Kornet anti-tank rockets. Many of these weapons among others are Iranian made and have been smuggled in through Syria. Although mounting sanctions on Iran have lowered their supply to Hezbollah by some 25%, while the border between Syria and Lebanon is mined to deter Syrian army defectors, this does not diminish Hezbollah's current arms supplies or determination to find alternate smuggling routes.  

The cleverness of the Central Intelligence Agency has also not been sparred, as several spies (likely of Lebanese nationality) were captured by Hezbollah. The spy ring was likely discovered due to counterintelligence work; tracking cell phone usage and pursuit of suspects. The same methods used to break up an Israeli intelligence ring in 2009. Such sophistication was not always present among the militant group who strike fear not only internationally but also at home. The March 14 Alliance has on several different occasions warned of the dangers of an armed Hezbollah and called for a transfer of power (especially in southern Lebanon) to the hands of the Lebanese Army Command.

The recent allegations against four Hezbollah members for the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, has the militant group on the one hand under immense pressure, while on the other, clamping down and using threats in order to achieve political gains. The danger of civil war always exists in the sectarian and multi-ethnic country of Lebanon and Hezbollah would not hesitate to spark an internal conflict if it felt its existence in imminent danger.

In terms of a renewed conflict with Israel, Hezbollah has used the excuse of gas fields excavated near the Lebanese border to remain armed, claiming that they would not hesitate to use force in order to protect what they deem as Lebanon's natural resources. 

It is clear through these recent incidents and strong Hezbollah involvement in the March-8 coalition that the militant group is not showing any signs of falling apart. Even as Iran and Syria absorb strong international sanctions, while the Lebanese army maintains "control" of southern Lebanon, Hezbollah remains looming in the background, strong and unhesitant to put up a fight to defend its honor and survival. 

Those traveling to S. Lebanon should check out this travel security website.

He Spoke... Now what?

Tensions in Egypt are high today following General Tanatwi's speech last night. The SCAF (The temporary ruling body in Egypt) leader presented a new timetable for the upcoming elections, hoping to quell the protesters. However, the protesters remain in the streets for now, while their leaders are considering their next move. The situation has an immediate effect on travel security and safety. While westerners are not targeted by protesters, incidental risks are relevant in the areas where the protests are taking place. It is also important to note the crime level in Egypt is on the rise, following the lack of proficient, motivated, police personnel (For a thorough assessment of crime in Cairo, feel free to email me with a particular area of interest). Contact Middle East Security vendors for local assistance.

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The demands that fueled the recent protest

Protesters originally took the streets with two major demands.

1.       To change the elections timetable. SCAF's proposed schedule prolongs over almost a year and includes several rounds before the presidential elections in 2013. This means that SCAF will remain in power for a long "temporary" period.

2.       To fire the government. This is especially relevant following the proposed constitutional bill that guarantees the Military's ability to overthrow governments when necessary, and does not allow any intervention by the parliament in the military budget.

What now?

In yesterday's speech Tantawi announced the resignation of the government and moved up the election schedule (to be concluded in June 2012, instead of early 2013). The speech did not have the expected effect yet. Protesters have not left the demonstration centers in Cairo and other cities. The next few hours are critical as political parties will decide how to react to the speech. We expect one of two probable scenarios:

1.       The political parties will decide to end the current wave of protest and cooperate with the upcoming parliament elections. Most parties do not wish to create a situation that will postpone the elections set for the 28^th.

2.       The protesters will use the existing momentum to request the full and immediate resignation of SCAF.  

Foreigners in Cairo are advised to avoid all protest. If you encounter a protest, do not try to document or photograph it in any way. The next couple of days will be critical as far as travel security, advice and safety. If possible, stay in leading hotels, with a high level of security and services (For any questions and specific concerns, don't hesitate to contact us.